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The Prüm regime: Situated dis/empowerment in transnational DNA profile exchange  
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper argues that despite recent critique of surveillance studies scholars pertaining to the 
shortcomings of the panoptic model, core conceptual tools in contemporary surveillance studies still 
privilege a focus on the oppressive elements of surveillance. This often yields unsatisfying insights 
into why surveillance works, for whom, and at whose costs. We discuss the so-called Prüm regime, 
regulating the transnational exchange of bioinformation for forensic and police use within the EU, to 
illustrate our claims. By articulating instances of what we call ‘situated dis/empowerment’, we 
highlight the large extent to which the empowering and disempowering effects of surveillance 
depend on each other.   
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1. Introduction: Looking beyond the panopticon 
 
The panopticon has traditionally been one of the central conceptual frames of surveillance studies. 
While it originally signified an 18th and 19th century prison architecture enabling the guard to watch 
prisoners at any time, it has since become a metaphor for a society in which surveillance is often 
invisible and impossible to escape. Moreover, because those who are surveilled are aware that they 
could be watched at any moment, they discipline themselves. Prisons, schools, or monasteries are 
classic examples of the disciplining effect of the panopticon, while closed circuit television (CCTV) has 
often been cited as the symbol of panoptic (‘all-seeing’) surveillance in the late 20th and starting 21st 
century (Lyon 2001; for a critical discussion see Lippert 2009; Hier 2004).  
 
Recent scholarly work – while acknowledging the overall value of the panoptic model for the analysis 
of dynamics of surveillance mechanisms and infrastructures –, increasingly draws attention to the 
limits of this model in aiding our understanding of surveillance in contemporary societies. For 
example, in his illuminating chapter ‘Tear down the walls: on demolishing the panopticon’, 
sociologist Kevin Haggerty argued that ‘important attributes of surveillance that cannot be neatly 
subsumed under the “panoptic” rubric have been neglected’ (Haggerty 2006: 23). He noted that 
because the panoptic model directs our gaze to the oppressive dimensions of surveillance, it does 
not ‘fit neatly within the preoccupations of [this model...] that surveillance can be experienced from 
both sides of the lens as “fun” or liberating’ (Haggerty 2006: 28); such as in the case of computer 
games (Albrechtslund and Dubbeld 2005), social media, or the use of mobile phones. In a similar 
vein, David Lyon (1994; 2001) argued that surveillance is not solely oppressive but often has enabling 
and empowering effects as well (the ‘Janus face’ of surveillance; see also Dubbeld 2006).  
 
Despite such observations by some of the thought-leaders in contemporary surveillance studies (see 
also Bigo 2006; Boyne 2000; Mathiesen 1997), much of the scholarly work discussing surveillance 
systems and practices still emphasises their oppressive effects. By under-exploring the empowering, 
productive, enabling, or even entertaining aspects of surveillance (for an exception: eg Albrechtslund 
and Dubbeld 2005), such case studies often fail to explain why some surveillance tools and practices 
are actively supported and adopted by those who are also affected by them. Because in such case 
studies surveillance technologies are merely seen as instruments through which power is exercised 
by some actors on others, surveillance is couched in the tradition of Foucault’s relatively early work 
on disciplinary power (Foucault 1975; Paras 2006). In his later work, Foucault (eg 1980a, 1980b, 
1983) relied on two additional and closely interlinked poles of power: regulation techniques at the 
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level of the population, and self-regulation of individuals. These two poles are helpful for the analysis 
of contemporary surveillance systems as they represent another step away from the traditional focus 
on coercive and centralised power. As opposed to the disciplinary model, in regulatory societies, 
norms and values of authorities are enacted by the individual at least as much as they affect her from 
the outside. Furthermore, in the regulatory model, people are being ‘normalised’, and normalise 
themselves, also through non-directive ways of intervention. In other words, while disciplinary power 
operates on the basis of pre-existing, substantial norms enforced by surveillance and punishment, 
regulatory techniques work the other way round: What they observe (patterns of social interaction, 
morbidity rates, common behaviours, etc) is what becomes normative. The boundary between ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ is thus not primarily achieved through a process of moral and/or ethical reasoning, but 
by observing and evaluating statistic material (see Lemke et al. 2000). Consequently, the means and 
techniques of norm enforcement in regulatory societies are not clear-cut; they operate as much from 
the bottom up and horizontally as they operate from top down. Mechanisms of individual self-
regulation complement the regulatory techniques employed by authorities at the level of the person 
who partakes in governing of her own self (Rose 1996; 1999; see also Digeser 1992; Prainsack 2006). 
They signify the ways in which we constitute ourselves in response to, and often in correspondence 
with, larger societal norms. For example, when we refrain from doing certain things in public places 
(using other people’s things without asking, shouting, or showing too much physical affection) this is 
typically not the case because we worry about being fined by the police, or being monitored via 
surveillance cameras, but because we have established ourselves as responsible and considerate 
people who genuinely believe that adhering to certain rules of conduct in public places is good or 
necessary. We regularly translate authoritative norms into our own personal commitments (Rose 
1999).  
 
An approach that certainly challenges the hierarchical bias of the panoptic model, and thereby 
accommodates analyses comprising also regulatory techniques, is Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000: 606) 
concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’. The surveillant assemblage signifies a cluster of interlinked 
systems and practices of surveillance which is continuously in flux, such as, for example, ‘airport 
surveillance’, which consists of different technological tools (surveillance cameras, duty free cashiers, 
luggage checks, tracking systems, etc), practices (body searches, passport controls), and rules. A 
surveillant assemblage does not have one fixed centre but many; the surveillance systems that it 
implies have not been designed as one coherent surveillance system generating centralised datasets, 
but they have grown into an assemblage of tools and practices yielding different kinds of 
decentralised datasets; they are not hierarchically structured but their structure is, as Deleuze and 
Guatarri (1987) called it, ‘rhizomatic’: a (mainly horizontal) network of interconnected points. The 
Original publication: Prainsack, B. and Toom, V. (2010), ‘The Prüm regime: Situated dis/empowerment in 
transnational DNA profile exchange’, British Journal of Criminology, 50(6): 1117-1135, see: 
bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/50/6/1117.abstract  
 
surveillant assemblage ‘operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings, and 
separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled in different 
locations as discrete and virtual “data doubles”’ (eg the boarding card information in the airport 
computer system; the image of the body scanner; the passport information; the memory of the 
barrista at a coffee shop in the gate area who remembers the ‘weird behaviour’ of a customer and 
reports it to her superior). The surveillant assemblage, as an analytic tool, takes as its reference point 
the human body which is taken apart (and later put together again) by various systems of 
surveillance at different levels. Because it does not require a focus on only one specific technological 
instrument, mechanism, or practice, it lends itself to analysing power dynamics that also – in addition 
to working from the top down –, work horizontally, and from the bottom up, such as the self-
monitoring of individuals. As Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 609) state, ‘desires for control, governance, 
security, profit and entertainment’ are often implied in surveillant assemblages. 
 
But also here, although the concept is open to seeing subjects of surveillance partaking in, or even 
desiring, their own surveillance, empirical analyses of studies of surveillant assemblages often fall 
short in portraying such constructive and productive participation in surveillance as anything but an 
instant of false consciousness. Part of the problem is arguably that while the concept of the 
surveillant assemblage sharpens our perception for important aspects and mechanisms of 
contemporary surveillance societies, such as flattening hierarchies and the dispersion of centralised 
power, in surveillance scholarship empoloying this notion, agency is often implicit. Drawing on work 
within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), what we mean by agency is the capacity to 
have an impact on the world (Law and Urry 2004; Barad 2003: 818), which is inherent in both human 
and non-human actors. Although action by human actors will regularly be intentional and purposeful 
(Wagenaar and Cook 2003), action does not require these properties in order to intervene in the 
world. The way that computers, for example, impact on the organisation of our work, is part of what 
we mean by agency.  
 
Locating agency means to spell out who and what exactly engages in surveillance systems – both in 
terms of ‘running’ surveillance tools or systems and in terms of being surveilled –, in what form, and 
in what setting(s). This is arguably related to the concept itself: Inherent in Haggerty and Ericson’s 
(2000: 606) definition that the ‘[surveillant] assemblage operates by abstracting human bodies from 
their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows’ is the ascription of agency 
to the theoretical concept itself; in other instances it is loosely attributed to ‘the state’, ‘the 
government’, or ‘companies’ (for an exception see Klauser 2009). This under-conceptualisation of 
agency – Marx and Muschert (2007: 380; see also Ball 2005) call it a failure to ‘disentangle the 
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multiple dimensions that make up the ideal types or to explore their distributions, correlations, and 
interrelations’ –, arguably also accounts for the over-emphasis on oppressive – ‘panoptic’ - elements 
in surveillance systems at the cost of the empowering ones. However, as argued above, it is exactly 
the empowering aspects of surveillance which explain much of the success of most surveillance 
systems.  
 
Situated dis/empowerment 
 
If we take this latter insight seriously, then we need a conceptual tool that allows us to see both the 
oppressive/disempowering, and the empowering aspects of surveillance. It should enable us to see 
who or what is at the centre of surveillance, and how, when and where agency is distributed, 
correlated and interrelated to understand how bodies or identities become (re)constituted. We use 
the term situated dis/empowerment to account for the need to also take into consideration the 
semiotic and material contexts of these processes, and to highlight the importance of ‘location, 
positioning, and situating’ (Haraway 1991: 195) of these practices and contexts. Most importantly, 
the notion of situated dis/empowerment helps us to see the ways in which empowering and 
disempowering effects of surveillance are always intertwined and often mutually constitutive.  
 
DNA profiling for forensic and police uses constitutes an important field of surveillance in present day 
societies (McCartney 2004). In this context, the so-called Prüm regime, with its objective to improve 
cross-border collaboration to combat terrorism, to fight cross-border crime, and to prevent illegal 
migration (Prüm Treaty 2005) by means of, among other things, transnational exchange of DNA 
profiles between all EU countries, is an example of a surveillance system with situated 
dis/empowerment effects. In the following section, after providing an overview of the Prüm Treaty 
and its subsequent trajectory within the EU, we will articulate instances of situated 
dis/empowerment within the Prüm regime. We will conclude the paper with reflections on what the 
notion of situated dis/empowerment helps us to see that would be difficult to discern with other 
conceptual tools. 
 
 
2. The Prüm regime: Instances of situated dis/empowerment  
 
On 27 May 2005, the so-called Prüm Treaty – named after the German town where the meeting took 
place – was signed by representatives of seven European countries, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Austria. It is commonly seen as a result of an initiative by 
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then German Minister of Interior, Otto Schily, in 2003, driven by the conviction that the measures of 
the Schengen Treaty (abolishing border controls and enhancing police cooperation) and the 
provisions of the former so-called Third EU Pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) 
were not sufficient to address growing levels of cross-border crime.1 As a result, the seven 
signatories of the Prüm Treaty decided to embark on a path of closer cooperation within the EU 
(Balzacq 2006; Luif 2007; De Neve 2007).  
 
Two years after the Treaty was signed, in June 2007, the EU Council of Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs decided to transpose core parts of the Treaty into EU Law (See Kirkegaard 2008: 245; 
Bellanova 2008).2 The formal adoption by the Council of the EU took place on 23 June 2008, and the 
Decision (2008/615/JHA; 2008/616/JHA) became effective in August 2008 (Prüm Decision 2008). By 
August 2011, all EU countries must comply with the Decision. This means that those countries which 
have not yet established centralised national forensic DNA databases, such as Italy, Greece, Malta, 
and Ireland, are required to do so to be able to allow law enforcement officers in other member 
countries to search their databases for potential matches of DNA and fingerprints.3 (Aspects of the 
Prüm Decision pertaining to fingerprints and vehicle data merit a separate discussion and are 
therefore not covered in this paper).  
 
Technocratic drivers of integration 
 
An enabling factor for the Prüm regime were early efforts of forensic scientists to standardise 
forensic DNA profiling technologies across national borders. These efforts date back to the late 
1980s, when the European DNA Profiling Group (EDNAP) was established with the explicit purpose of 
‘harmonizing the DNA technology for crime investigation’ in light of fears of an ‘escalation of cross-
border crimes’ in an increasingly integrated Europe (EDNAP 2009; another important institution is 
the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, ENFSI, see below). Soon after the establishment 
of EDNAP, in the early 1990s, short tandem repeats (STRs) were introduced for use in DNA-based 
forensic identification. An STR is a short DNA fragment – that is, a particular succession of 
nucleotides – that repeats itself at a given physical location (locus) at the genome. In the population 
at large, STRs manifest themselves in a varying, but finite, numbers of repeats at any given locus. 
Hence, two individuals may show two different numbers of repeats at a given locus, which is 
reflected in different STR profiles. At the population level, although many people share the same 
number of STRs at some loci, the likelihood of two non-biologically related individuals sharing the 
same number of STRs at more than one locus is very small. When a DNA profile is presented at court, 
it is typically accompanied by a ‘random match probability’ (RMP) figure. The RMP is the estimated 
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frequency of a DNA profile expected to occur in a reference population. A RMP of, for example, one 
in a billion means that the chances that a randomly drawn DNA sample from a given population 
‘coincidentally’ matches the DNA sample from the crime scene is one in a billion (see: Butler 2005: 
500).  
 
In 1995, EDNAP designated two STRs as ‘ideal candidate loci for obtaining reproducible results 
between laboratories within both the European and international forensic communities’ (Kimpton et 
al 1995: 150). Soon, other loci followed. Seven of these loci, together with sex test amelogenin (sex 
chromosome test), were combined in a commercially available multiplex DNA typing system 
developed and offered by the British Forensic Science Services (FSS). This so-called ‘second 
generation multiplex’ (SGM) system, and its successor SGM+ (10 loci and amelogenin), have since 
been adopted by more than 20 jurisdictions, including Austria, England, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Wales (Fereday 2004: 34). Hence, by means of SGM(+) and comparable other DNA 
typing systems, forensic scientists set up the basic conditions of possibility for the Prüm Treaty. Soon 
thereafter, the so-called European Standard Set (ESS), consisting of seven STR loci, was proposed by a 
group of forensic scientists of the ENFSI. The EU funded the ENFSI to increase collaboration ‘between 
European laboratories, ultimately leading to the formation of a pan-European database’ (Gill et al 
2000: 1).  
 
At the same time, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) worked towards a 
standardised set of loci too (see Leriche et al 1998). Their efforts resulted in the establishment of the 
Interpol Standard Set of Loci (ISSOL), which is nearly identical to ESS. These standards importantly 
contributed to the Interpol DNA Gateway which became operational in June 2005. The DNA Gateway 
consists of a dedicated central database where all Interpol member countries can upload DNA traces 
and subject profiles. Exchange of DNA profiles between countries usually occurs on an individual 
case-by-case basis. In case of a ‘hit’, centrally stored DNA profiles which member countries upload to 
the Interpol Gateway ‘pop up’ on the computer screens at national contact points which have 
uploaded the same profiles to the system. Whether individual member countries respond to the 
query by checking whether the profile matches any profiles in their own database is up to them.  
 
Despite Interpol’s efforts to make the DNA Gateway a success, ‘legislation and/or data protection 
rules prohibit the effective transfer of international DNA profiles’ (Fisher 2004: 31; see also Williams 
and Johnson 2008: 155-6). Moreover, because Interpol has no effective means to enforce compliance 
with the DNA Gateway’s objectives, the level and intensity of use of the Gateway varies strongly 
among member countries. This uneven uptake of active participation in the Interpol DNA Gateway 
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across the globe restricts the overall usefulness of the system for those countries who participate 
fully (see also McCartney et al 2010: 40-45).  
 
The Prüm Decision sets out to remedy some of these issues, at least for EU countries, by doing away 
with the requirement for countries to upload data into a separate, shared database; instead, officials 
working for national DNA databases in EU countries can directly search existing operational 
databases of other countries for matches with their own DNA profiles, on a hit/no hit basis (see 
below). However, countries can still refrain from following up on a suspected ‘hit’; for example, when 
starting investigative measures would seem unreasonable given unlikely chances for success, or 
when the acquisition of information or evidence on a case from another country would conflict with 
national law. 
 
How exactly does it work? 
 
When member countries start exchanging DNA profiles within the Prüm system, as a first step, all 
DNA profiles obtained from crime scene traces (DNA traces) stored in their national DNA databases 
are compared against profiles stored in the databases of other Prüm countries. Hence when the 
Dutch and German DNA database connected for the first time in July 2008, approximately 25,000 
Dutch crime scene profiles were submitted to Germany, and approximately 125,000 such profiles 
from Germany were sent to the Netherlands. From then on, all new DNA profiles (both subject 
profiles and profiles obtained from crime scene traces) which individual countries upload to their 
own DNA databases are exchanged daily at a fully automated basis against all other DNA databases 
in Prüm countries. To date, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Romania, Spain, 
Slovenia, and The Netherlands compare DNA profiles within the Prüm regime on a daily basis; it is 
expected that Finland will follow suit in the course of 2010. As mentioned above, all other EU 
countries need to be ‘Prüm-ready’ by August 2011. In addition, in January 2009, Iceland and Norway, 
which are not members of the EU, decided to link their DNA, fingerprint and vehicle data to those of 
EU countries (EU Council 2009).  
 
That Prüm countries exchange DNA profiles on a so-called hit/no hit basis means that the automatic 
exchange results only in a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer regarding the presence of a match with another 
profile, without disclosing any nominal data about the matching profile’s originator. If the system 
notifies the authorities of a ‘match’, then – after cross-checking the identity of the profile’s originator 
with the help of biometric or dactyloscopic (fingerprint) data – all further measures which lead to the 
potential arrest of the suspect are carried out on a bilateral basis. For example, when a full ‘match’ 
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between a subject profile and a crime scene profile has been found in the Dutch and German 
databases (e.g. when a DNA related to a homicide in the Netherlands matches a subject profile in the 
German DNA database), Dutch authorities contact the German National Contact Point and request 
nominal data of the subject profile with which a match was found. Such information will be 
distributed through mutual assistance procedures. As soon as personal data of this suspect is known, 
a juridical enquiry can be (re)opened.  
 
Another scenario in the Prüm context entails the occurrence of matches between profiles derived 
from two or more crime scene stains. For example, it could be the case that four different crime 
scene stains in three different countries have the same genetic profile, suggesting that they all 
originate from the same person. This allows crime investigators to make inferences to connections 
between different crimes likely to have been committed by the same person or the same group of 
people. This, in turn, regularly generates information about likely migration patterns of the 
(unknown) suspect(s) in question.  
 
Situated dis-empowerment: The issue of data protection 
 
The Prüm regime has given rise to much criticism pertaining to function creep, threats to civil rights, 
and materialisation of a police state (see eg Bunyan 2010; Kirkegaard 2008; Bellanova 2008, Guild 
and Geyer 2008). Although we do not dispute the value and importance of such concerns, an analysis 
of the Prüm regime as a surveillance system focusing on the oppressive aspects of surveillance is of 
limited use in understanding its technological, economic, societal, and discursive dimensions, and 
ultimately also of the practical, operational, ethical challenges that the implementation of the Prüm 
regime raises (Cabezudo Bajo, forthcoming). In what follows we will articulate different instances 
where the Prüm regime has started to have effects that are best described in terms of situated 
dis/empowerment.  
 
One field where the Prüm regime has taken effects of situated dis/empowerment is data protection. 
Data protection was one of the most controversially debated issues at the time of transposing the 
Prüm Treaty into EU law (Kirkegaard 2008). Data protection experts initially criticised the absence of 
data protection laws applicable to the transnational exchange of DNA profiles (Bellanova 2008). They 
argued that existing EU data protection rules were not applicable to police and judicial co-operation 
in criminal matters. However, the Prüm Decision has its own data protection provisions which 
override, in their capacity as a lex specialis, more lenient regulatory provisions in member countries, 
which in effect can be expected to lead to better data protection within the Prüm regime than it is 
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the case in some national countries. In addition, the issue of data protection was addressed by the 
adoption of rules ‘on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ specifically (EU Council 2008). Thus, in this case, 
supranational norms can result in stricter data protection practices. 
 
Moreover, the Prüm regime will probably decrease, rather than increase, the amount of personal 
data which travels across borders. In the pre-Prüm era, when authorities in one country assume that 
a suspect is currently in another country, they resort to processes laid out in traditional cross-border 
legal aid agreements to request the other countries’ support in locating and accessing the individual. 
For this purpose, nominal data pertaining to suspects (such as dates of birth, last known addresses, 
etc) are transmitted across borders. Within the Prüm regime, such personal data only crosses 
national borders if a profile hit in the database has been confirmed bilaterally. Thus, the 
implementation of the Prüm regime may lead to a more targeted exchange of identifying personal 
information only in cases where a preliminary suspicion has been supported by a confirmed DNA-
profile match.  
 
In sum, on the one hand, the Prüm regime undoubtedly grants authorities better access to large 
amounts of increasingly useful data; this is mainly due to the added value of data mining possibilities 
in a growing database. The Prüm regime thereby exacerbates the potentially oppressive elements of 
surveillance and renders wider groups of people vulnerable to becoming ‘objects of surveillance and 
investigation because of the calculability of their criminal risks to others’, as Lynch and McNally 
(2009: 284) eloquently put it (see also Machado et al 2010). On the other hand, however, the 
complex of surveillance systems inherent in the Prüm regime also empowers those who demand 
higher data protection standards, not only by highlighting the topic of data protection in the political 
and public domain as a valid concern in light of the increasing size and interlinking of databases, but 
also – and perhaps more importantly – by restricting the amount of personal identifying information 
that travels across borders. The latter also benefits suspects whose identifying details, in pre-Prüm 
times, would have been submitted to authorities in other countries while this is no longer the case 
within the Prüm regime (unless a DNA match has been established). 
 
Situated dis/empowerment: Power shifts within the criminal justice system 
 
The Prüm Decision has already started to shift rationales of governance in the field of policing and 
prosecution. In light of an increasing transnationalisation of criminal investigation, more attention is 
paid to those types of information which ‘travel well’ across borders due to the Prüm Decision: DNA, 
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fingerprints, and vehicle data. This shifts the centres of gravity of power away from criminal 
investigators in two main directions:4 To forensic technocracy, and to the Prüm National Contact 
Points. These shifts may eventually have implications for the position of victims as well.  
 
As has been shown above, members of what we termed the ‘forensic technocracy’ have been among 
the main drivers of the Prüm regime.5 Due to the fact that forensic DNA analysis – as opposed to eg 
fingerprint, shoe print, or tool mark analysis – is carried out in largely automated manners in 
laboratories, it is seen by many stake holders as ‘more scientific’ than other forensic technologies 
(Hindmarsh and Prainsack 2010). Also that DNA profiles are discrete data which can be compared by 
computers rather than fingerprint patterns or tool marks, which are in need of human interpretation, 
arguably contributes to the reputation of forensic DNA technologies as a ‘truth machine’ (Lynch et al 
2008). DNA technologies are seen as less prone to human error. Although the presumed infallibility 
of forensic DNA technologies have experienced serious contestation recently (for a summary see 
Prainsack 2010a), their current status as a gold standard in criminal investigation locates the 
production of crucial evidence for truth-finding in the forensic science laboratory. Thus, it is no 
longer the criminal investigator who is seen as the bearer of the decisive expertise for solving a 
crime, but the forensic scientist. This shift is certainly also catalysed by public representations of 
criminal investigations in widely successful TV shows such as Crime Scene Investigation (CSI), where 
the judgement of police detectives is portrayed as fallible while machines never make mistakes. 
Technological tools assume the roles of neutral, objective, and infallible visualisation machines for 
evidence that ‘never lies’ (Kruse 2010; M’charek 2008; Toom 2009).  
 
However, the Prüm regime does not only shift power from criminal investigators to forensic 
technocracy (in the wide sense of the word), but it also grants National Contact Points a more central 
position. They become ‘centres of calculation’ where various forms of information converge (Latour 
1990: 59; see also Cole 2001: 235). By connecting the various national databases, the Prüm regime 
facilitates the matching of subject profiles to unsolved crimes in different national jurisdictions, 
thereby turning individuals into suspects who would previously have remain unaffected by the 
investigation (see below, and Toom 2010b). Thus, it propels criminal investigations starting with a 
‘cold hit suspect’, that is, an individual for whom ‘there is no basis for suspicion other than a 
database hit (or match)’ (Cole & Lynch 2006: 47; see also: Toom 2010a). Instead of taking the details 
of a crime as a starting point and looking for suspects based on what is known about the crime, such 
investigations start with a suspect that needs to be connected to the details of a crime. Once a ‘cold 
hit’ match has been established between a subject profile and an unsolved crime, police investigators 
and public prosecutor are alerted by the Prüm National Contact Point. Police can then open a 
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criminal investigation against this suspect. Thus, National Contact Points become ‘obligatory passage 
points’ (Callon 1986) in a growing number of cases in the sense that the work of police investigators 
will start on their initiative and initially rely on information obtained from them. In an investigative 
epistemology (Innes 2002: 684) driven by a cold-case approach, also the work of public prosecutors is 
increasingly depends on the work of National Contact Points.  
 
Last but not least, these power-shifts could have implications for the position of victims. Will the 
increasing orientation towards cold-hit driven ‘genetic policing’ (Williams & Johnson 2008) affect the 
willingness and readiness of police to invest in finding the perpetrator when no biological traces are 
available, especially – but not only – in cases when it is expected that the perpetrator may be outside 
of the country’s jurisdiction? A so-called ‘CSI effect’ has been documented for jurors and judges, who 
put more weight on DNA evidence than on other kinds of evidence, or who refuse to convict in 
absence of such (Brewer and Ley 2010; for an overview see Durnal 2010). It remains to be seen 
whether the criminal investigation will be immune to such a CSI effect. Ironically, police investigators 
are often aware of such a danger and emphasise the need for ‘good old’ police work (Prainsack 2007; 
2010b; Huey 2010). It is exactly the stronger reliance on technological tools, not the reliance on 
human judgement and interpretation, which introduces the risk of undue bias.  
 
Situated dis/empowerment (and beyond): Shifting resources to volume crime? 
 
A third instance of situated dis/empowerment in the context of Prüm concerns the consequences of 
a changing focus within the types of crime that will require (and receive?) extensive resources in the 
context of criminal investigation. The implementation of the Prüm regime by EU countries can be 
expected to lead to a growing operational importance of transnational bioinformation exchange. 
Moreover, it is expected that in light of the ongoing globalisation, and the expansion of the EU in 
particular, the urgency of preventing and solving volume crime will raise. This, in turn, would render 
the use of DNA profiling also in the realm of volume crimes increasingly attractive.  
 
DNA analysis can contribute to the detection of crimes and, more importantly, help so solve them. 
Drawing on a UK Home Office Forensic Science and Pathology Unit report (Home Office 2006), 
Williams and Johnson (2008: 122) diagnosed ‘a positive effect on the overall detection rate when 
crime scene DNA is found and successfully matched with subject DNA’ on the national database in 
the case of volume crime. Similar findings were obtained from experimental programmes in other 
countries (Ashikhmin n.d.; Bond 2007; Roman et al 2008; Fraser and Williams 2009). Solving crimes 
can be considered a ‘good’ to the extent that it satisfies crime victims. In this light the increasing 
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exchange of DNA-profiles across borders could lead to a larger number of criminal cases to be closed, 
allowing those affected from them to process emotions and consolidate their financial 
consequences. Due to this inherent promise alone, DNA analysis can be seen as empowering citizens 
in general and victims in particular. That this argument can also be used to support law-and-order 
types of arguments – which the authors personally do not subscribe to – does not detract from the 
importance of acknowledging that many citizens feel empowered by forensic technologies that 
promise to lead to higher detection and conviction rates. It is arguably exactly for this reason the 
Prüm Decision has not prominently featured in mass media; it was presumed that supposedly better 
tools for fighting crimes are a positive development that not many would disagree with; thus it did 
not qualify as newsworthy.6 Whether the Prüm regime will indeed lead to higher detection and/or 
conviction rates is a separate question which we will only be able to answer once the Decision has 
been implemented by all EU countries, and DNA-profiles have been exchanged within this framework 
(see also McCartney et al 2010).  
 
Another characteristic of forensic DNA analysis is that it is believed to have a deterrent effect on 
criminal offenders. Although no convincing empirical evidence in support of this assumption has 
been presented so far (McCartney 2004: 161-162), the Prüm Decision mobilises this promise 
explicitly (Prüm Decision 2008: article 1). The assumption is that if a person knows that her DNA-
profile is stored in a centralised police database, she will be deterred from committing a crime 
because she is very likely to be detected. Consequently, so the argument continues, the more DNA 
subject profiles are in a database, the fewer crimes will be committed (Etzioni 2004: 201). Such is a 
classical rational choice perspective, which regards criminal offenders as rational, benefit-maximising 
subjects who carry out cost-benefit analyses prior to committing a crime. While this may be true for 
some criminal offenders, especially within the group of ‘career criminals’ (Prainsack and Kitzberger 
2009), there is no evidence on the basis of which this observation can be applied to the majority of 
criminal offenders. However, independent of the empirical evidence for the accuracy of the 
deterrence argument, it has tangible effects, one of which consists of a shift in resources: Given the 
high cost of DNA analysis (both in terms of staff and technical and laboratory resources), the 
expectation that (a) volume crime committed by non-residents is on the increase, and that (b) DNA 
analysis offers a solution not only leading to higher detection rates and by deterring criminal 
offenders in the first place, additional resources being made available for DNA analysis seem a logical 
consequence. As it is unlikely, especially in the current economic climate, that resources for criminal 
investigation will increase significantly overall, the implementation of the Prüm regime is likely to 
effect a shift in resource allocation away from types of crime that do not easily converge with DNA 
typing, eg child abuse, human trafficking, or fiscal crimes, to crime types that are typically 
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accompanied with securing biological traces, eg burglary, or car theft. Such a development would 
reinforce social divisions (Lyon 2003: 182) by devoting yet more attention to crimes against property 
at the cost of crimes against bodily integrity, and white collar crime. 
 
These shifts are difficult if not impossible to classify in terms of either disempowerment or 
empowerment. They go beyond these categories insofar as they affect the rationales of governance 
in this field, and the norms according to which actors structure their actions. In other words, the 
shifts described in this sub-section concern the way that a field is rendered capable of structured 
intervention; and in turn, how the field is organised both for the purpose and as a result of its 
governance. Again, the term governance here signifies both top-down regulatory provisions 
structuring the actions of actors in this field (eg rules on in what kinds of cases DNA evidence is 
secured at the crime scene, and what resources are available for its analysis), and modes of self-
governance of individuals who employ these rules and develop them further along these rationales. 
Just as Digeser’s (1992) concept of the ‘fourth face of power’ does not allow the classification of the 
effects of power in terms of whose interests are harmed, because it conceives of interests as 
something that is established by the exercise of power instead of preceding it, the results of the likely 
shift of focus on volume crime effected the Prüm Decision would not only affect existing stake holder 
‘interests’ but also constitute new ones. That the subjectivity of a person is (re)configured in the 
process of power being exercised means that at the moment when a person, for example, becomes 
the subject of an investigation due to a ‘hit’ in the DNA database although she would not have 
implicated in the investigation otherwise, her subjectivity, and her ‘interests’, shift: the person may 
start to understand herself in terms of a suspect; she might contact her lawyer; in other words, she 
becomes a new stake holder in the field. In a cold-case driven policing approach, such configurations 
of subject positions as new suspects are a frequent occurrence.  
 
3. Conclusion  
 
This paper set out to contribute to a better conceptualisation of agency – by which we refer to 
actions by humans and nonhumans that continuously reconfigure the world – in the surveillance 
studies literature. Taking the insightful critique of some surveillance studies scholars of the central 
role of the panoptic model as our point of departure, we argued that even approaches that enable us 
to see how power is exercised also horizontally and from the bottom up, such as the surveillant 
assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), have not solved the problem of an over-attention to the 
oppressive dimensions of surveillance. Moreover, although some authors have recently highlighted 
the productive, comforting, and even entertaining aspects of surveillance, it is rarely spelled out who 
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benefits from surveillance, by what means, and who pays the price. Most importantly, little explicit 
attention has been paid to how empowering and disempowering effects of surveillance systems 
often constitute each other. This leaves open the question of why surveillance works, and why 
individuals regularly do not actively oppose surveillance and sometimes actively enlist in it (Monahan 
2010). 
 
To address this problem we introduced the concept of situated dis/empowerment, seeking to draw 
attention to the large extent to which of oppressive/disempowering and empowering elements are 
co-produced (Jasanoff 2004). A conceptual tool that conceives of empowerment and 
disempowerment as interlinked and co-created, leads our gaze to unexpected places. First, it leads us 
to discern shifts of power from one actor to another – and thus greater possibilities for the latter to 
structure their own and other actor’s actions –, rather than to diagnose instances of the former 
controlling or monitoring the latter. Second, it helps us to be perceptive to new subject positions 
which arise in a given surveillance context. And, third, it helps us to understand not only why some 
actors are likely to enlist in surveillance while others are likely to resist, but also what factors are 
capable of shifting this balance.  
 
The case study we chose to illustrate our concept of situated dis/empowerment is the transnational 
exchange of forensic DNA profiles in Europe, the so-called Prüm regime. Because of the strong and 
central role that governmental actors play in this system of surveillance, it could be tempting to 
suffice with a critique of the Prüm regime as a pan-European biosurveillance regime, highlighting the 
instances in which it conflicts with civil liberties and exacerbates existing biases. Instead, we 
articulated three instances of situated dis/empowerment effectuated by the Prüm regime. First, 
pertaining to data protection, we argued the Prüm regime is likely to render a wider group of 
subjects vulnerable to becoming objects of surveillance. At the same time, however, we held that the 
Prüm regime will probably decrease the amount of identifying information that travels across 
borders and will therefore empower those who benefit from higher data protection standards. 
Second, we argued that the new investigative epistemology of policing catalysed by the Prüm regime 
is one where DNA evidence assumes a central role in criminal investigation. This leads to shifts of 
power away from criminal investigators to forensic technocracy, and to National Contact Points 
within the Prüm system. We articulated this as an instance where the effects of a surveillance system 
cannot easily be classified as either empowering or disempowering, as they affect the rationales of 
governance and the distribution of power rather than compromising or fostering the needs and 
interests of actors. Instead, these effects lay the grounds for new subject positions, patterns of 
practice, and informal rules to emerge. Third, pertaining to growing attention to using DNA 
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technologies to solve volume crime throughout Europe, we argued that DNA technologies, if they 
indeed contribute to higher detection and conviction rates, will empower civilians in general and 
victims in particular. Simultaneously, the same development is likely to divert attention and 
resources away from types of crimes where no biological traces are commonly found. In other words, 
it is likely that foregrounding volume crimes will lead to an empowerment of house and car owners 
as these crimes are typically accompanied by sampling DNA traces, whereas this will mean that 
probably less resources will be invested in the prevention and prosecution of crimes that not easily 
converge with DNA typing, such as human trafficking, child abuse or fiscal crimes. The latter will 
probably lead to a further erosion of the fragile position of the victims of those crimes. 
 
Arguments highlighting the benefits of forensic DNA technologies assume a hegemonic position in 
public discourses, where crime is typically assumed to be the problem and tools to fight crime are 
proposed to be the answer. Within this rational, surveillance is seen as a necessary evil which needs 
to be accepted for a greater good. Such discourse is reified by the success stories of DNA 
technologies that we hear and read on almost a daily basis. Against this backdrop it is difficult to 
resist plans to increase the effectiveness of forensic DNA technologies without being accused of 
obstructing a safer society, or as choosing the sides of ’the crooks’.  
 
The discursive economy relating to this topic within the social sciences is very different. As was 
outlined in the first part of our paper, the scholarly discourse arguably tends to over-emphasise 
oppressive sides of surveillance systems in general and DNA profiling and surveillance in particular. 
While we regard this latter phenomenon as a productive counter-weight to the emphatic embrace of 
intense and increasingly wider uses of forensic DNA technologies by publics and many stake holders, 
the disconnect between the normative stances prevalent in the public vs the social science realms is 
not conducive to a broader and more nuanced debate of the benefits, risks, and effects of their use. 
What our concept of situated dis/empowerment contributes to closing this gap is that it focuses our 
gaze on the practical, material, and semiotic (Haraway 1991) organisation of a given surveillance 
system, thereby fostering greater sensitivity for the situatedness of the distribution of agency, and to 
how identities are (re)constituted by surveillance practices. With the help of this concept we 
analysed how data protection issues, power shifts within the criminal justice system, and shifting 
resources to volume crimes can be understood as both empowering and disempowering. How and 
where, and to whom, it may be dis/empowering depends on the material semiotic practices which 
make up a concrete instance of action or practice.  
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By spelling out the regime, we demonstrated how situated dis/empowerment can be used for a 
critical analysis of the Prüm regime, articulating how empowering and disempowering effects are co-
constituted and depend on each other. As our example of data protection has shown, the same rules 
and practices that lead to a further accumulation of power for governmental authorities also result in 
a reduction of practices invasive of individual privacy in certain circumstances. This example also 
showed that situated dis/empowerment can only be articulated if the starting point of the analysis 
does not consist of abstract concepts and concerns but if it material, semiotic, and practical 
dimensions are in the centre. The concept of the surveillant assemblage, while being very helpful in 
conceptualising power as something that is distributed and exercised by and to different actors and 
arenas, still tends to ascribe agency to the theoretical concept itself, or to unduly abstracted actors 
such as the government, the police, or the media. Hence, situated dis/empowerment as a concept 
instructs us about the domains we study and their normative effects. In our instance, the 
transnational exchange of DNA profiles, the particular extents and ways in which this processes 
happen vary across nations, as they depend on the legal and practical configurations of forensic DNA 
technology use. We hope that in the years to come, detailed empirical and comparative studies of 
practices of the use of DNA in criminal investigations nationally and transnationally will enable a 
deeper understanding of these national differences.  
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1 However, Guild et al. (2008: 5) argue that the ‘Prüm Treaty is not merely a technical attempt to accelerate the 
exchange of information among the participating member states. It is rather a countervailing political force 
against the EU’s [Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, AFSJ].’ The authors argue that the Prüm Treaty has 
weakened the EU more than it has strengthened it, namely by by creating new hierarchical structures; by 
compromising mutual trust among EU countries; by resorting to an intergovernmental framework which 
excludes the European Parliament; and by compromising the Hague Principle of Availability (which would in 
effect remove all national borders from mutual data use among EU countries, while the Prüm framework limits 
mutual data use to certain levels of the information). For these reasons, Balzacq (2006) argues that the 
provisions of the Prüm Treaty are not, ratione materiae, compatible with EU law. See also Kirkegaard (2008). 
2 Those provisons of the Prüm Treaty that were not transposed into EU law continue to be effective for 
transnational data exchange among the signatory countries of the Treaty. 
3 The Prüm Decision applies to the exchange of vehicle data as well; however the transnational exchange of 
vehicle data has already started. 
4 We are grateful to Robin Williams to alerting us to the instances discussed in this paragraph. 
5 McCartney et al (2010: 40) report similar assessments from stake holders in the UK. 
6 Media attention has been paid, however, to national DNA databases both in the UK and in the US; however 
this was triggered by recent contestations of the infallibility of forensic DNA technologies, and by the European 
Court of Human Right’s 2008 S and Marper vs UK judgment pertaining to practices of DNA profile retention in 
England and Wales (Prainsack 2010a). The Prüm Decision does not feature prominently in the public debate in 
this instance either.  
